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Stone Got Caught Between a Rock and a
Hard Place: Grand Juries' Power to
Subpoena Outtakes That Reveal
Confidential News Sources
by MARTY KASSMAN*
Introduction
Bradley M. Stone is a Detroit television journalist who spent
a few hours in the Wayne County (Michigan) Jail in Septem-
ber, 1986. He was not on assignment; rather, he was sent there
by a state judge for refusing to comply with the judge's order to
turn over a short segment of videotape to a grand jury. Stone
refused because the videotape might have revealed the identi-
ties of confidential sources of information. Stone is no longer
behind bars, and it now appears that he will be able to keep his
videotape and avoid returning to jail.1 His case, however, raises
questions of vital concern to journalists and to their viewers,
listeners, readers and news sources.
The purpose of this note is to examine what protection the
United States Constitution affords to a journalist who is or-
dered by a grand jury to provide unpublished information
which would compromise confidential sources, particularly
where, as in Stone's case, the journalist is not alleged to have
participated in or witnessed criminal activity.
The note will review the four opinions written in the key
case on constitutional protection of news sources, Branzburg v.
Hayes,2 and how those opinions have been received and inter-
preted in the decade-and-one-half since they were released. It
will discuss how the law of reporter's privilege3 has developed
* B.S., Arkansas State University, 1982; Member, Third Year Class. The author
was a television and radio journalist before entering law school.
1. For details of Stone's case, see infra notes 124-84 and accompanying text.
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
3. The meaning of the term "reporter's privilege" in this note comports gener-
ally with the definition of "newsman's privilege" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 940
(5th ed. 1979): "The alleged constitutional right (freedom of speech and press) of a
newsman to refuse to disclose the sources of his information." "Reporter's privilege,"
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since Branzburg and, some say, in spite of Branzburg.4 Statu-
tory and administrative privileges and their inadequacies will
be mentioned briefly. The note will explore the Bradley Stone
case in some detail by setting out the facts and judicial history,
reviewing the arguments made by both sides, and summarizing
the final judicial statement on the case, the 1987 opinion by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.' Finally,
the note will examine various opinions on whether or not jour-
nalists should have a special privilege for protection of confi-
dential sources and what the scope of such a privilege ought to
be.
I
What Did Branzburg Actually Say?
The Branzburg decision, on its face, certainly is detrimental
to the interests of those who favor reporter's privilege.' The
case's holdings were against the journalists, and there was an
immediate outcry from news organizations.7 According to vari-
ous commentators, however, Branzburg often has been misin-
terpreted, ignored or incorrectly applied.8 The concurring
as used here, also encompasses a similar right emanating from sources other than the
Constitution. It is distinct from that dictionary's definition of "journalist's privilege,"
which concerns protection from defamation actions where malice is absent. Id. at 753.
4. See, e.g., D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 300 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter D.
PEMBER (3d ed.)] ("Despite this high Court ruling, the lower federal courts and state
courts have fashioned a constitutional-common law privilege which often protects a
journalist who has been subpoenaed to testify at a legal hearing."); Bulger, Reporter's
Privilege by Rule of Court: New Approach Fails... or Does It, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
513, 534 (1985); Note, Circumventing Branzburg: Absolute Protection for Confiden-
tial News Sources, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 615 (1984).
5. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovan), 810
F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987).
6. D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 323 (4th ed. 1987): "The Branzburg decision
[wasi initially a bitter blow to those persons who believed that the recognition of at
least a limited reporter's privilege was essential to the free flow of information in the
society .. "
7. See, e.g., Editors Declare Ruling on Newsmen Is 'a Blow to Right of People to
Be Informed' N.Y. Times, June 30, 1972, at 15, col. 4.
8. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4; Comment, The Newsperson 's Privilege in
Grand Jury Proceedings: An Argument for Uniform Recognition and Application, 75
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 413, 427 (1984). The author of the Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology comment, unlike some other commentators, believes that
Branzburg has been interpreted too strictly against journalists: "Courts have inter-
preted Branzburg to preclude the use of the newsperson's privilege in grand jury pro-
ceedings for a number of reasons. The primary reason is that courts have misapplied
Branzburg's narrow holding." Id. The comment is further discussed infra notes 39-40
& 197-203 and accompanying text.
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opinion of Justice Powell and the dissenting opinions of Justice
Stewart (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) and Justice
Douglas have been treated by some courts as establishing, by a
five-to-four majority, some protection for journalists from re-
vealing confidential sources.9 It is therefore essential to a dis-
cussion of reporter's privilege that Branzburg be carefully
analyzed.
A. The Four Cases Decided in Branzburg
Branzburg actually was a consolidation of four cases, two of
which - Branzburg v. Hayes and Branzburg v. Meigs - in-
volved Paul Branzburg, a staff reporter for the Louisville Cou-
rier-Journal, a daily newspaper. 10
In Hayes, Branzburg had written a story describing his obser-
vation of two people, whose identities he had promised not to
reveal, synthesizing hashish from marijuana. 1 Branzburg was
subpoenaed by a grand jury; he appeared, but he refused to
identify his subjects, asserting privileges under the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, several provisions of
the Kentucky Constitution, and the Kentucky reporter's privi-
lege statute.12 Kentucky courts rejected his arguments and or-
dered him to answer the grand jury's questions. 13
The Meigs case involved a later article in which Branzburg
described the "drug scene" in Frankfort, Kentucky through
conversations with and observations of unnamed drug users.' 4
9. D. PEMBER (3d ed.), supra note 4, at 291.
10. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667; N.Y. Times, June 30, 1972, at 15, col. 1. Branzburg
also was a Harvard Law School graduate. Id.
11. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667-68.
12. Id. at 668. The statute is the same today as it was when Branzburg's cases
arose. It reads:
No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial
before any court, or before any grand jury or petit jury, or before the presid-
ing officer of any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the general as-
sembly, or any committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative
body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information
procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by a radio or
television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with
which he is connected.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
13. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-69; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state's highest court at the time, held that the
statute did not allow a reporter to refuse to testify about events he had witnessed or
people who participated in those events. The court drew a distinction between that
and refusing to divulge the identity of an informant. 461 S.W.2d at 347-48.
14. 408 U.S. at 669.
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A grand jury subpoenaed Branzburg to testify about violations
of statutes prohibiting drug use and sale.15 This time, rather
than appear voluntarily, Branzburg moved to quash the sub-
poena, now arguing that his effectiveness in reporting on the
drug culture would be "totally destroyed" merely by his being
"required to go behind the closed doors of the Grand Jury
room," even if he were not required to say anything.16 Ken-
tucky courts again rejected his arguments. 7
Another of the four cases, In re Pappas, concerned Paul Pap-
pas, a television reporter for WTEV in New Bedford, Massa-
chusetts." He had been permitted to enter Black Panther
headquarters on the condition that he not disclose anything he
saw or heard inside except an anticipated police raid.'9 There
was no raid, and Pappas did not report what had happened at
the headquarters while he was there.20  Later summoned
before a grand jury, Pappas appeared and answered some ques-
tions, but he refused to say what had taken place inside the
headquarters, asserting a first amendment privilege to protect
confidential informants.2' Upon receiving a second summons,
Pappas filed a motion to quash; Massachusetts courts rejected
his constitutional arguments and denied the motion.22
The other case decided in Branzburg was United States v.
Caldwell, the only one of the four cases in which the court be-
low - in this case, the Ninth Circuit - had held for the jour-
nalist. Earl Caldwell was a black New York Times reporter in
San Francisco who had been taken into the confidence of Black
Panther leaders and provided Times readers with insight into
the organization.23 A federal grand jury in the Northern Dis-
trict of California, which the Government said was investigat-
15. Id.
16. Id. at 669 & n.5 (quoting Branzburg's Motion to Quash).
17. Id. at 670-71. The Kentucky Court of Appeals decision in Meigs was unre-
ported. Id. at 665.
18. Id. at 672; N.Y. Times, June 30, 1972, at 15, col. 3.
19. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 672-73.
22. Id. at 673-75; In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971). Massachusetts
had, and still has, no statutory reporter's privilege. 408 U.S. at 673; Bulger, supra note
4, at 514.
23. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 321; N.Y. Times, June 30, 1972, at 15, col. 2; see,
e.g., Caldwell, Panther Charged in Nixon Threat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1969, at 37, col. 7
(Black Panther party officer arrested in San Francisco on charges of threatening
President Nixon's life).
[Vol. 10:623
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ing threats against President Nixon and other possible criminal
violations, issued a subpoena duces tecum ordering Caldwell to
appear with notes and tape recordings of interviews given him
by Black Panther officials.24 After Caldwell objected to the
scope of the first subpoena, a second subpoena was issued omit-
ting the documentary requirement and simply ordering Cald-
well to appear and testify.25 Caldwell and the Times moved to
quash, arguing that forcing Caldwell to appear in secret would
suppress first amendment freedoms by creating distrust be-
tween news media and militants.26
The district court agreed that the first amendment protected
Caldwell from forced disclosure of "confidential associations,
sources or information" until the Government had shown an
overriding national interest which could not be served by alter-
native means. It held, however, that Caldwell must divulge any
information he had been given for publication, and it refused to
quash the subpoena. Some months later, when a new grand
jury had been convened, the court denied another motion to
quash and ordered Caldwell to appear before the grand jury.28
Caldwell repeatedly refused and was ordered to be jailed for
contempt of court. 9 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
contempt order, holding that, absent a special government
showing of necessity, the first amendment gave Caldwell a
privilege to refuse to appear, because such an appearance could
be detrimental to the flow of news to the public. °
24. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675-77; Times Reporter Gets a Subpoena, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1970, at 20, col. 1. The subpoena, which was dated January 30, 1970, ordered
Caldwell to appear at the federal courthouse in San Francisco with
[n]otes and tape recordings of interviews covering the period from January 1,
1969, to date, reflecting statements made for publication by officers and
spokesmen for the Black Panther Party concerning the aims and purposes of
said organization and the activities of said organization, its officers, staff, per-
sonnel, and members, including specifically but not limited to interviews
given by David Hilliard and Raymond "Masai" Hewitt.
408 U.S. at 675 n.12. Hilliard, the Black Panther party's national chief of staff, had
been arrested in San Francisco on December 3, 1969, on charges of threatening Presi-
dent Nixon's life. Caldwell, Panther Charged in'Nixon Threat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1969, at 37, col. 7.
25. 408 U.S. at 675-76.
26. Id. at 676.
27. In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 362 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
28. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 678.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 679; Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
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B. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, affirmed the Ken-
tucky and Massachusetts judgments and reversed the Ninth
Circuit's judgment.31 Justice Byron White wrote the Court's
opinion, in which Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices
Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist and Lewis Powell
joined.32 In that opinion, the Court declined to "interpret the
First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege
that other citizens do not enjoy. '33 It found no first amend-
ment privilege "to refuse to answer the relevant and material
questions asked during a good-faith grand jury investigation,"
let alone a privilege to refuse even to appear pending a govern-
ment showing of compelling need. 4 Although the Court stated
that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment pro-
tections, and grand jury investigations if instituted or con-
ducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly different
issues for resolution under the First Amendment, ' 35 it held
that Branzburg and Pappas must appear before the grand juries
which had subpoenaed them.36 In Caldwell, the Court appeared
to hold that the lower federal courts must now rule on other
issues raised by Caldwell.37
As was noted earlier, commentators and courts have had dif-
ficulty in determining how the Branzburg holdings should be
applied. 8 One commentator, noting that the Branzburg Court
"made clear that reporters who observe a crime must testify
before a grand jury as to whom and what they saw," contends
that lower courts have "overextrapolated this holding" by re-
fusing to recognize a constitutional privilege when reporters re-
31. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665, 708-09.
32. Id. at 665. One source of confusion over the meaning of Branzburg may be the
erroneous impression that Justice White's opinion represented the views of only four
Justices. See, e.g., In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (referring to "plural-
ity and concurring opinions in Branzburg"); D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 322 (omitting
Justice Powell from a list of Justices subscribing to the opinion of the Court); Good-
dale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 709, 715 (1975) (author, counsel for the New York Times in Caldwell,
refers to Justice White's "plurality opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes "); Comment, supra
note 8, at 427 n.78 (referring to Justice White's "Branzburg plurality opinion").
33. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690.
34. Id. at 708.
35. Id. at 707.
36. Id. at 708-09.
37. Id. at 708.
38. Supra notes 4 & 8-9 and accompanying text.
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ceive confidential information about crimes they have not
witnessed.3 9 In Paul Branzburg's cases, the Court did empha-
size that, "if what petitioner wrote was true, he had direct in-
formation to provide the grand jury concerning the commission
of serious crimes. '40 However, the Court made no mention of
any alleged witnessing of crimes by Pappas or Caldwell. The
fact that Branzburg apparently witnessed crimes seems merely
supportive of the Court's holdings, not necessary to them.
Another questionable interpretation of Branzburg came
from a federal district court in McArdle v. Hunter,4 a civil case
in which the court quashed a subpoena of a reporter's notes and
tape recordings. The court stated that Branzburg "acknowl-
edged the existence of a 'qualified privilege' with respect to
'newsgathering.' "42 This analysis seems overly optimistic from
a journalist's viewpoint. The court's reference apparently was
to the following Branzburg passage: "Nor is it suggested that
news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protec-
tion; without some protection for seeking out the news, free-
dom of the press could be eviscerated. '43 In light of the
Supreme Court's lengthy and explicit rejection of a conditional
privilege in a later portion of the Branzburg opinion,44 the
quoted passage appears to be little more than lip service to free-
dom of the press.45
C. The Powell Concurrence
Although Justice Powell joined the Court's opinion in
Branzburg,46 he wrote a brief separate opinion "to emphasize
what seems to me to be the limited nature of the Court's hold-
ing. ' 4" Justice Powell wrote that if a journalist were called
upon to give testimony compromising confidential sources and
39. Comment, supra note 8, at 427.
40. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708-09.
41. 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2294 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
42. Id. at 2294.
43. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
44. Id. at 702-06. "The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege
would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order." Id. at 703-04.
45. See Denniston, The Burger Court and the Press, in THE BURGER YEARS 23, 36
(H. Schwartz ed. 1987): "On the 'right to gather news,' it was evident that the dissent-
ers had provoked the majority into a grudging acknowledgement that such a right
might exist under the First Amendment." But cf. infra notes 180-81 and accompany-
ing text (Sixth Circuit interprets Branzburg to call for a balancing process).
46. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
47. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the testimony were not necessary to law enforcement, he could
move to quash the subpoena.48 Powell stated that "[t]he as-
serted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and
the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with re-
spect to criminal conduct."49
Journalists Branzburg, Pappas and Caldwell had urged that
the Government be required to make a three-part showing -
relevancy, lack of alternative sources, and compelling need -
before a reporter could be forced to appear before a grand
jury." Justice Potter Stewart adopted that idea in his dissent-
ing opinion.51 Justice Powell wrote that requiring such a show-
ing would defeat the proper balancing of constitutional and
societal interests.52 Justice Powell also felt that Justice Stew-
art was wrong to suggest that the Court's decision meant "that
state and federal authorities are free to 'annex' the news media
as 'an investigative arm of government.' -s
Justice Powell's concurring opinion purports to be merely a
clarification of the Court's holdings and a response to Justice
Stewart's dissent.5 4 However, the protection which Justice
Powell would afford journalists' confidential sources appears to
exceed any privilege even remotely suggested by Justice
White's majority opinion.55 One commentator characterizes
Branzburg as follows: "The Court was badly split in its decision
on the three cases. Four justices voted against the constitu-
tional privilege, four voted in favor of the constitutional privi-
48. Id. at 710.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 680 (opinion of the Court).
51. See infra text accompanying note 64.
52. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell explained:
[Aibsent the constitutional preconditions that Caldwell and that dissenting
opinion would impose as heavy burdens of proof to be carried by the State,
the court-when called upon to protect a newsman from improper or preju-
dicial questioning-would be free to balance the competing interests on their
merits in the particular case. The new constitutional rule endorsed by that
dissenting opinion would, as a practical matter, defeat such a fair balancing
and the essential societal interest in the detection and prosecution of crime
would be heavily subordinated.
Id. at 710 n. *.
53. Id. at 709 (quoting id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
54. Id.
55. See id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting): "While MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S enig-
matic concurring opinion gives some hope of a more flexible view in the future, the
Court in these cases holds that a newsman has no First Amendment right to protect
his sources when called before a grand jury."
[Vol. 10:623
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lege, and Justice Lewis Powell voted in favor of the
constitutional privilege in some circumstances, but not in these
cases.''56 Lower courts faced with claims of constitutional re-
porter's privilege have sometimes used the Powell concurrence
as a guide, upholding claims of privilege where it appears that
Justice Powell and the four Branzburg dissenters would do
SO.
5 7
D. The Dissenting Opinions
Two dissenting opinions were filed in Branzburg: one by Jus-
tice Stewart, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall, and one by Justice William Douglas.
1. The Stewart Dissent
Justice Stewart reasoned that since freedom of the press
must include a right to gather news58 - a point even the
Court's majority had conceded5 9 - it also implies "a right to a
confidential relationship between a reporter and his source. 6 °
This proposition must follow, he wrote, if one recognizes that
(1) journalists need informants to gather news, (2) confidential-
ity is essential to creating and maintaining relationships with
informants, and (3) "an unbridled subpoena power . . . will
either deter sources from divulging information or deter re-
porters from gathering and publishing information. '61
Stewart noted that previous cases had erected safeguards
against interference with first amendment rights by legislative
and executive investigations.62 These safeguards, he wrote,
56. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 322. In a 1974 address at Yale Law School, Justice
Stewart described the alignment of the Justices as follows:
In the cases involving the newspaper reporters' claims that they had a con-
stitutional privilege not to disclose their confidential news sources to a grand
jury, the Court rejected the claims by a vote of five to four, or, considering
Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion, perhaps by a vote of four and a half
to four and a half.
Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975).
57. D. PEMBER (3d ed.), supra note 4, at 291; see Bulger, supra note 4, at 534:
"Branzburg could not have been more emphatic in its law; however, the dictum of
Justice Powell still haunts us and has been repeated in inferior federal courts where
'balancing' has enhanced the testimonial rights of journalists." See generally infra
notes 74-99 and accompanying text.
58. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
59. Supra text accompanying notes 35 & 43.
60. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 738-41. The first amendment concern in the cases Stewart cited was
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"must apply to the grand jury inquiries in these cases."63
Accordingly, when a reporter is asked to appear before a
grand jury and reveal confidences, I would hold that the gov-
ernment must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe
that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a
specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the in-
formation sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information.
... Obviously, before the government's burden to make such
a showing were triggered, the reporter would have to move to
quash the subpoena, asserting the basis on which he considered
the particular relationship a confidential one.64
Although Stewart conceded that "only in very rare circum-
stances would a confidential relationship between a reporter
and his source be so sensitive that mere appearance before the
grand jury by the newsman would substantially impair his
news-gathering function, '65 he concluded that Caldwell was
such a case.66 He would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit in
Caldwell and remanded the two Branzburg cases and Pappas to
the state courts for further proceedings consistent with his
opinion.
2. The Douglas Dissent
Justice Douglas, who is said to have "subscribed to an absolu-
freedom of association, not freedom of the press. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legisla-
tive Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (contempt conviction for refusal to di-
vulge information contained in NAACP membership lists reversed as violative of
rights of assocation protected by first and fourteenth amendments). Two cases that
Stewart discussed at length were decided on due process, not first amendment,
grounds. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (contempt conviction for
refusal to answer state attorney general's questions in "subversive persons" investiga-
tion reversed as violative of fourteenth amendment due process clause); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (contempt of Congress conviction for refusal to an-
swer questions about acquaintances' former membership in Communist Party re-
versed as violative of fifth amendment due process clause). First amendment
concerns were involved, however, and some language in the cases supported Stewart's
dissent. Watkins provides a good example of this: "Clearly, an investigation is subject
to the command that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or
press or assembly. While it is true that there is no statute to be reviewed, and that an
investigation is not a law, nevertheless an investigation is part of lawmaking." Id. at
197.
63. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 741 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 743 (footnotes omitted).
65. Id. at 751.
66. Id. at 751-52.
67. Id. at 752.
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tist view of the freedom of the press, argued that a reporter
should never have to appear or testify before a grand jury.69
The only "compelling need" the government could show which
would qualify a reporter's "immunity," he wrote, would be the
reporter's own implication in a crime; and in that event, the
fifth amendment's prohibition of compelled self-incrimination
would protect him.7" "Since in my view there is no area of in-
quiry not protected by a privilege, the reporter need not appear
for the futile purpose of invoking one to each question. "71
Justice Douglas rejected the idea of "balancing" protection of
sources against the needs of law enforcement, stating his belief
that "all of the 'balancing' was done by those who wrote the
Bill of Rights" and framed the first amendment "in absolute
terms."72 He wrote, "I see no way of making mandatory the
disclosure of a reporter's confidential source of information on
which he bases his news story.' 7 3
II
Reporter's Privilege Since Branzburg
In the sixteen years since Branzburg was decided, journalists
have often been protected from having to make disclosures
which would compromise confidential sources This protection
has come from courts, state legislatures, the United States De-
partment of Justice, and other sources.
A. "Creeping Shield Law" in the Courts
The President of the Massachusetts Senate, in a 1985 article
strongly critical of any reporter's privilege, decried a "creeping
shield law E7 1 that appears to be developing in the inferior fed-
68. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1026 (5th ed. 1976);
see also J. DURAM, JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 114-25 (1981).
69. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 713. The first amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of... the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
73. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
74. The term "shield law," as used in this note, refers generally to a statute which
protects journalists from forced disclosure of confidential sources and/or unpublished
information. Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (5th ed. 1979), which defines "shield
laws" as "[s]tate statutes which afford privilege to journalists to not disclose informa-
tion (i.e. notes and other materials) obtained during [the] course of their newsgather-
ing." Shield laws vary greatly as to scope and manner of protection. See infra notes
103-10 and accompanying text.
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eral courts."75 Indeed, some journalists have been successful in
asserting a constitutional privilege; this success, however, de-
pends on the type of case and other circumstances.76
1. Civil Cases
Claims of reporter's privilege are most likely to succeed in
civil cases, especially where the journalist is not a party.77 In
Baker v. F & F Investment,"8 the Second Circuit took note of
Branzburg but upheld a district court's refusal to order a jour-
nalist to reveal sources of information:
Manifestly, the [Branzburg] Court's concern with the integ-
rity of the grand jury as an investigating arm of the criminal
justice system distinguishes Branzburg from the case presently
before us. If, as Mr. Justice Powell noted in that case, in-
stances will arise in which First Amendment values outweigh
the duty of a journalist to testify even in the context of a crimi-
nal investigation, surely in civil cases, courts must recognize
that the public interest in non-disclosure of journalists' confi-
dential news sources will often be weightier than the private
interest in compelled disclosure.79
The court said that the plaintiff, who sought disclosure, had not
exhausted other possible sources of information; that disclosure
75. Bulger, supra note 4, at 534. The author expressed the opinion that this was
not likely to happen in Massachusetts courts "[b]ecause of the high caliber of our
judiciary." Id.
76. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 324.
77. Id. at 328. But cf. United States v- Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 816 (1983):
We see no legally-principled reason for drawing a distinction between civil
and criminal cases when considering whether the reporter's interest in confi-
dentiality should yield to the moving party's need for probative evidence. To
be sure, a criminal defendant has more at stake than a civil litigant and the
evidentiary needs of a criminal defendant may weigh more heavily in the
balance. Nevertheless, the standard of review should remain the same. In-
deed, the important social interests in the free flow of information that are
protected by the reporter's qualified privilege are particularly compelling in
criminal cases. Reporters are to be encouraged to investigate and expose,
free from unnecessary government intrusion, evidence of criminal wrong-
doing.
78. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
79. Id. at 784-85; cf. In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir.
1982):
The law in this Circuit is clear that to protect the important interests of
reporters and the public in preserving the confidentiality of journalists'
sources, disclosure may be ordered only upon a clear and specific showing
that the information is: highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to
the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other sources.
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was not essential to protecting the public interest; and that the
information sought was not central to the case."°
2. Criminal Cases
Courts often apply Justice Stewart's three-part test (or varia-
tions thereof) in criminal proceedings where forced disclosure
of a journalist's confidential information is sought by the prose-
cution or the defendant."' However, if the information is rele-
vant to the charges, disclosure usually is required. 2 In United
States v. Cuthbertson,3 for example, the Third Circuit held
that, although "journalists possess a qualified privilege not to
divulge confidential sources and not to disclose unpublished in-
formation in their possession in criminal cases, '8 4 the defend-
ant in the case at bar had made a sufficient showing to justify
the district court's requiring CBS, Inc., to produce statements
of witnesses for in camera inspection. 5 The contempt citation
80. Baker, 470 F.2d at 783. The Fifth Circuit also recognizes a qualified first
amendment privilege against compelled disclosure of the identity of confidential news
sources, a holding "dictated by our careful reading of the plurality and concurring
opinions in Branzburg v. Hayes." In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983).
Other courts recognizing a constitutional or "federal common law" reporter's privi-
lege in civil cases include the First Circuit, Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspa-
per Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); the Third Circuit, Riley v. City of Chester, 612
F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); the Fourth Circuit, LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 79 (1986); the Tenth Circuit, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); and the District of Columbia Circuit, Zerilli v. Smith, 656
F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
81. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 328; Comment, supra note 8, at 425. See, e.g.,
United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983),
quoted supra note 77; United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981), discussed infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
But cf New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1331, 1336, 1337 (Marshall, Circuit
Justice 1978) (refusing to stay contempt penalties against journalists for nonproduc-
tion of subpoenaed materials for in camera inspection, despite New Jersey trial
court's lack of "independent determinations of materiality, relevance, and necessity,"
because Justice Marshall doubted that four Justices would vote to grant certiorari, in
light of Branzburg).
82. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 329 (citing Kansas v. Sandstrom, 225 Kan. 717, 595
P.2d 324 (1978)). But cf. Comment, supra note 8, at 425: "Courts... frequently deny a
criminal defendant's request for a reporter's confidential information when the de-
fendant is unable to demonstrate that the desired information is necessary, material,
and unavailable from an alternative source."
83. 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980) (appeal of CBS, Inc., third party witness), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
84. Id. at 147; accord State v. Hurston, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2295, 2296 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. 1978).
85. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 148.
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against CBS for refusing to do so was upheld.86
3. Grand Jury Investigations
Where reporters have sought protection from grand jury sub-
poenas, courts generally have toed the Branzburg line, since
Branzburg is directly on point in such cases.87  In Lewis v.
United States, 8 for example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
contempt citation of a radio station general manager. The man-
ager had refused to comply with a grand jury subpoena order-
ing him to produce the original of a communique which his
station had received from a group claiming responsibility for a
bomb explosion.8 9 The Ninth Circuit cited Branzburg and,
although it did not flatly reject the manager's contention "that
a qualified first amendment privilege survived Branzburg,"
said that the manager had shown no grounds for relief.9"
Only three years before its Lewis decision, the Ninth Circuit
- in Bursey v. United States91 - stated that the first amend-
ment applied to grand jury proceedings92 and reversed orders
requiring two reporters for the Black Panther newspaper to an-
swer certain grand jury questions touching on, among other
things, publication and distribution of the newspaper and pam-
phlets.93 After the government petitioned for rehearing in
light of Branzburg - which had been decided one day before
Bursey - the court denied the petition, stating that Bursey did
not involve newsgathering or the question whether or not a
journalist had to appear before a grand jury.94 Since it was the
Ninth Circuit that had decided Caldwell, which was reversed in
Branzburg,95 some reluctance to apply Branzburg was perhaps
to be expected. Lewis, however, indicates that the Ninth Cir-
cuit is following Branzburg.
86. Id. at 149. The contempt order was, however, reversed to the extent that it
related to statements of nonwitnesses. Id.
87. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 330-31.
88. 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 237.
90. Id. at 238.
'91. 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
92. Id. at 1082.
93. Id. at 1086-88. The court held that one of the reporters could be compelled to
answer questions about whether or not she had seen firearms and explosives at Pan-
ther headquarters and about whether or not she had heard Panther leaders discussing
violent activities. Id. at 1086 n.20.
94. Id. at 1090, 1092.
95. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
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Other federal courts of appeals have asserted that some sort
of qualified reporter's privilege in grand jury proceedings was
recognzed in Branzburg, but these statements were dicta, as the
cases at issue were not grand jury cases.96 At least one state
court has applied a first amendment privilege to grand jury
proceedings. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon
Duncan,9 7 a Texas trial court granted a television reporter's
motion to quash a grand jury subpoena of videotape outtakes,
holding that disclosure "should not be compelled in the absence
of a concern so compelling as to override the rights of freedom
of speech and press."98 Until other courts begin to agree, from
the journalist's standpoint:
About the only good news one can find when examining the
manner in which courts have responded to reporters' refusal to
testify before grand juries is the diminishing number of sub-
poenas which are being issued today. Journalists are simply
not being called to testify as often in the 1980s as in the past.99
B. Statutory and Administrative Privileges
There has been other "good news" for journalists concerned
about protecting confidential sources: the development of stat-
utory and administrative privileges. However, this has not ob-
viated journalists' pursuit of constitutional protection:
[M]any reporters find it more to their liking to work to develop
the limited First Amendment protection than to ask the gov-
ernment - the same government upon which they are ex-
pected to report - for a special protection. When push comes
to shove, many reporters note, the government can strip away
any protection it has given to the press. That cannot happen so
easily with a privilege grounded in the First Amendment. 00
What follows is a brief examination of statutory and adminis-
trative reporter's privileges and why journalists consider them
inadequate.
1. Shield Laws
At the time Branzburg was decided, 17 states had adopted
some sort of statutory protection of journalists' confidential
96. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Baker v. F & F Inv.,
470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972).
97. 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1979).
98. Id. at 1153.
99. D. PEMBER (3d ed.), supra note 4, at 298.
100. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 337.
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sources.'' In the sixteen years since, nine more states have ad-
ded shield laws. 102 These laws vary greatly as to who they pro-
tect, in what circumstances they apply, and what sort of
privilege is provided. 10 3 For example, the shield law in Michi-
gan's criminal procedure code protected only print journalists
at the time television journalist Bradley Stone was cited for
contempt.'0 4 The Michigan courts refused to extend the shield
law's protection to Stone.' By contrast, California's shield
law 0 6 explicitly protects broadcast journalists as well as print
and wire service journalists. As interpreted, however, it does
not protect freelance journalists who have not yet reached an
"arrangement with a publication or organization described by
the statute."'0 7 The Michigan statute, before it was amended in
December, 1986, spoke in terms of privileged communica-
tions;' the California law makes no mention of privilege, but
forbids governmental bodies to hold journalists in contempt for
101. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 (1972).
102. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 334; Comment, supra note 8, at 434.
103. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 334-38; Comment, supra note 8, at 434-38.
104. The version in effect at that time read in relevant part: "In any inquiry au-
thorized by this act communications between reporters of newspapers or other publi-
cations and their informants are hereby declared to be privileged and confidential."
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982) (amended 1986). For a discussion of the
Stone case, see infra notes 124-84 and accompanying text.
105. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovan), 810
F.2d 580, 581 (6th Cir. 1987). The Michigan legislature amended the shield law while
Stone's case was on appeal. The portion concerning journalists now reads:
A reporter or other person who is involved in the gathering or preparation of
news for broadcast or publication shall not be required to disclose the iden-
tity of an informant, any unpublished information obtained from an inform-
ant, or any unpublished matter or documentation, in whatever manner
recorded, relating to a communication with an informant, in any inquiry au-
thorized by this act, except an inquiry for a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for life when it has been established that the information which is
sought is essential to the purpose of the proceeding and that other available
sources of the information have been exhausted.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(1) (West Supp. 1987).
106. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988).
The constitutional and statutory provisions are almost identical.
107. In re Van Ness, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2563, 2564 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1982). The
court justified its holding thus: "Otherwise, any intrusive and self-anointed 'busybody'
could by subsequent self-proclamation assert priviliges under Evidence Code section
1070, which was meant and intended as a professional protection for a restricted
class." Id. But cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977)
(appeal of Arthur Buzz Hirsch, non-party witness) (constitutional privilege protected
confidential information obtained by filmmaker who was "not a regular newsman"
but had formed production company to make documentary film about Karen
Silkwood case).
108. See supra note 104.
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refusing to disclose unpublished information or sources of in-
formation. °9 Some other states' shield laws protect sources but
not unpublished information. 110
The above examples illustrate not only the lack of uniformity
among various states' shield laws but also the problem of in-
complete protection. "Even the so-called absolute shield laws
are rarely absolute. Exceptions that can trap journalists are al-
ways present.""' In addition, shield laws often are narrowly
construed by judges who do not like them." 2 All this is why,
rather than depend upon what may turn out to be "an illusion
of protection rather than real protection," 113 even journalists in
states with shield laws want courts to recognize a privilege
under the first amendment." 4 Of course, in nearly half the
states, there is not even the imperfect protection of a shield
law. Nor has Congress seen fit to pass a shield law applying to
federal courts, although such legislation has been introduced
repeatedly since 1959."1
2. Justice Department Guidelines
The Justice Department has issued a set of guidelines for fed-
eral prosecutors and Government civil litigators who consider
issuing subpoenas to members of the news media." 6 United
States Attorneys are instructed to try to obtain information
from alternative sources and to negotiate with the media before
subpoenas are sought." 7 If these measures fail, a subpoena may
be issued only with the Attorney General's authorization,
which is to be given only where the information sought is "es-
sential" and is not "peripheral" or "speculative.""' Whenever
possible, subpoenas are to be directed at limited subject matter
109. See sources cited supra note 106.
110. Comment, supra note 8, at 437. The Kentucky statute is an example. See
supra note 12. Unpublished information is sometimes protected by courts which rec-
ognize a qualified constitutional privilege. See, e.g., Miller v. Mecklenburg County,
602 F. Supp. 675, 679 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that privilege applies even to non-confi-
dential information supplied by confidential sources, "[a]lthough the non-confidential
nature of the material will be considered in the balancing of competing interests").
111. D. PEMBER (3d ed.), supra note 4, at 302.
112. Id. at 303.
113. Id. at 304.
114. See supra text accompanying note 100.
115. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689 n.28; see D. Pember (3d ed.), supra note 4, at 302.
116. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1980).
117. § 50.10(b)-(c).
118. § 50.10(e)-(f)(2).
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covering a reasonably limited period of time and are to "avoid
requiring production of a large volume of unpublished mate-
rial."' 19 The guidelines state that "the approach in every case
must be to strike the proper balance between the public's inter-
est in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the
public's interest in effective law enforcement and the fair ad-
ministration of justice. 120
Journalists certainly welcome whatever protection is af-
forded by these guidelines; however, the protection is incom-
plete. Although failure to follow the guidelines may subject a
United States Attorney to "an administrative reprimand or
other appropriate disciplinary action," 2 1 the guidelines state
that they "are not intended to create or recognize any legally
enforceable right in any person.' '122 Of course, the guidelines
are applicable only in cases where the federal government is a
party, although some state and local law enforcement agencies
have adopted similar rules.1
23
III
The Bradley Stone Case
The case of Detroit television journalist Bradley Stone illus-
trates the difficulties journalists face in trying to protect confi-
dential sources, even in states with shield laws.
A. Facts and History Prior to the Sixth Circuit Decision
Bradley M. Stone is a producer 21 for WJBK-TV, channel 2 in
Detroit. WJBK-TV is owned by Storer Communications, Inc.' 5
119. § 50.10(f)(6).
120. § 50.10(a).
121. § 50.10(n).
122. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 8, at 429:
The federal administrative newsperson's privilege is inadequate because it is
no more than guidelines issued by the United States Attorney General regu-
lating federal prosecutors' power to issue subpoenas to the media. The privi-
lege does not have the force of law. The Attorney General may excuse a
federal prosecutor from complying with the guidelines or rescind the re-
quirements at any time.
(Footnotes omitted.)
123. D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 338.
124. The legal documents in this case refer to Stone as a "reporter." This note
assumes that Nightline anchor Ted Koppel's references to Stone as a "producer" were
correct. The distinction has no bearing on the legal issues in this case, as Stone clearly
was acting in a journalistic capacity.
125. Respondent-Appellee's Brief in Opposition to Petitioners-Appellants' Motion
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In July, 1985, Stone taped 126 interviews with members of De-
troit youth gangs for a series of reports which began airing on
July 29, 1985.127 He promised not to identify the individuals he
spoke with; in exchange, they talked candidly on tape about
drugs and gang-related activities. 2 ' Stone's interviewees
threatened to kill him if he ever should disclose their
identities.
129
On August 29, 1985, an off-duty Michigan state trooper was
shot to death in an area in which Stone had taped part of his
story the month before.130 Investigation indicated that two
teenagers directly responsible for the trooper's death were
members of the gang interviewed by Stone and were among
those taped.1 3 '
On September 26, 1985, the Wayne County Prosecuting At-
torney issued subpoenas to representatives of Storer, directing
them to appear before the Wayne County Citizens' Grand Jury
the following week and produce all written and recorded
materials connected with Stone's series on youth gangs.132
Storer filed a motion to quash, stating that the materials sought
contained confidential information protected by the Michigan
for Certificate of Probable Cause and in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal [and]
Brief on Appeal at 2,3, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Storer Communications, Inc. v.
Giovan), 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1787) [hereinafter Prosecutor-CA6].
126. Although the legal documents in this case repeatedly refer to "filming" by
Stone, they use the word "tape" to describe what he refused to turn over to the grand
jury. This note assumes that the interviews were videotaped. The differences be-
tween film and videotape have no bearing on the legal issues in this case.
127. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 2; Brief in Support of Storer Communica-
tions, Inc.'s Claim of Appeal at 1, 7, In re Contempt of Stone, 154 Mich. App. 121, 397
N.W.2d 244 (1986) (No. 91189) [hereinafter Stone-Mich. App.].
128. Stone-Mich. App., supra note 127, at 2. One gang member told Stone: "About
gang war-if you owe us some money and mom and them at home, and you ain't there
and we can't find you, your mama goes." Another said: "I shot lots of people. In this
business, you can't have a conscience. I mean, if you-if I'm gonna cry over everybody
I pop, I might as well not even be here." Nightline: Protecting a Reporter's Sources at
1 (transcript of ABC television broadcast, Sept. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Nightline].
129. Stone-Mich. App., supra note 127, at 2.
130. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 2.
131. Id. But see Petitioners-Appellants' Brief in Support of Motion for Certificate
of Probable Cause and in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Brief on Ap-
peal at 23, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovan), 810
F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1787) [hereinafter Stone-CA6]: "There is ... serious
question as to whether the individual who is responsible for the shooting was even
present.., when the segment in question was filmed .... "
132. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 2; Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 2.
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shield law 33 and by a federal constitutional privilege."' After
an evidentiary hearing, Wayne County Circuit Judge William J.
Giovan denied the motion to quash, and new subpoenas were
issued to Storer and Stone, directing Stone to appear before a
newly convened grand jury.13 5 Storer filed an application for
leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The applica-
tion was denied.
1 36
On March 6, 1986, Stone appeared before the grand jury. He
testified and turned over some material, but he refused to pro-
duce certain tape - a segment 30 to 60 seconds long - which
had not been used on the air and "which may disclose the faces
of individuals who had been interviewed under a promise of
confidentiality."' 37 On March 18, 1986, after Stone again re-
fused to turn over the tape, Judge Giovan held him in civil con-
tempt and ordered him jailed until either he complied with the
subpoena or the grand jury term expired. 3
The Michigan Court of Appeals granted Storer's motion for a
stay of the contempt order, but on August 18, 1986, the court
issued a unanimous opinion affirming the contempt order.139
The Supreme Court of Michigan, by a four-to-two vote on Sep-
tember 4, 1986, denied an application for leave to appeal and
motion for stay. 40 The next day, Storer and Stone filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a stay of en-
forcement of the contempt order in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.' 4 1 District Judge
Richard F. Suhrheinrich denied the petition and motion on
September 9, 1986.142 The next day, Stone appeared before
Judge Giovan, repeated his refusal to comply with the grand
jury subpoena, and was incarcerated in the Wayne County
Jail. 14
3
Stone was in jail for one day. On September 11, 1986, the
Sixth Circuit granted a motion by Storer and Stone to stay en-
133. Supra note 104.
134. Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 2.
135. Id. at 2-3.
136. Id. at 3; Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 4.
137. Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 3, 14; Stone-Mich. App., supra note 127, at 4.
138. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 4; Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 3-4.
139. In re Contempt of Stone, 154 Mich. App. 121, 397 N.W.2d 244 (1986).
140. In re Contempt of Stone, 426 Mich. 854 (1986).
141. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 7; Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 5.
142. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 7; Stone-CA6, supra note 131,' at 5-6.
143. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 8; Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 6.
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forcement of the contempt order and ordered Stone's immedi-
ate release from custody pending results of his appeal.1 "
B. The Arguments and their Disposition by the Sixth Circuit
Stone s141 arguments for a privilege not to surrender the
videotape were based on the Michigan shield law and the first
amendment. Because this note's focus is on constitutional pro-
tection of news sources, the shield law arguments will be dealt
with quite briefly.
As was mentioned above, the Michigan shield law in effect
when Stone was cited for contempt protected only print jour-
nalists. 46 After unsuccessfully arguing in the Michigan courts
that the shield law protected television journalists,47 Stone ar-
gued in the federal courts that the statute, as interpreted and
applied, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.148 The prosecutor 149 disagreed 150 and prevailed in
the Sixth Circuit.' 51
In the portions of their briefs addressing the first amend-
ment issue, both sides made effective use of the facts of the
case. The prosecutor, as one might expect, focused on the crim-
inal investigation which allegedly was being hampered by
Stone's refusal to surrender the videotape:
In the futile and tragic attempt to protect his own life and
that of his companion, Trooper Hutchins was brutally and
senselessly murdered. In all probability, the Appellants hold
the key to the public's right to vindicate his murder. The pub-
lic's right to unlock this door is overwhelmingly superior to the
144. Sources cited supra note 143.
145. The arguments of the petitioners-Storer Communications, Inc. and Bradley
M. Stone-will be referred to as arguments of "Stone."
146. Supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
147. For Stone's arguments to the Michigan Court of Appeals on this point, see
Stone-Mich. App., supra note 127, at 5-9.
148. For Stone's arguments to the Sixth Circuit on this issue, see Stone-CA6, supra
note 131, at 24-38.
149. Respondents named in the petition by Storer and Stone were Wayne County
Circuit Court Judge William J. Giovan, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney John D.
O'Hair, and Wayne County Sheriff Robert Ficano. Since the prosecutor's office repre-
sented all of the respondents, this note will use the term "the prosecutor" to refer to
the respondents.
150. For the prosecutor's arguments to the Sixth Circuit on this issue, see Prosecu-
tor-CA6, supra note 125, at 39-40.
151. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovan), 810
F.2d 580, 586-88 (6th Cir. 1987).
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continued anonymity of his murderers.152
Nor did Stone's brief lack dramatic language about what was
at stake:
The lower courts' failure to adopt [a qualified reporter's privi-
lege] . . . has the most devastating and chilling effect on the
exercise of First Amendment rights. It undermines the inde-
pendence of the press and reduces Channel 2 to a mere appen-
dage of government during the grand jury investigation. 53
Each side thus presented its parade of horribles. As the par-
ties portrayed the case, the Sixth Circuit was faced with a
choice between two sets of frightening consequences: on the
one hand, the escape from justice of the murderers of a heroic
public servant; on the other hand, the destruction of WJBK-TV
as a news medium independent of government. This sort of
Hobson's choice is, of course, the crux of the entire debate over
reporter's privilege. Part IV of this note.5 . examines the debate
in detail.
The first amendment arguments of both sides discussed
Branzburg v. Hayes155 at length. Since the decisions in
Branzburg were against the journalists, Stone attempted to dis-
tinguish his case from the four Branzburg cases:
In sharp contrast to the facts in the case at bar, these
[Branzburg] cases involved reporters who witnessed or may
have witnessed the criminal activities about which they were
reporting, whose investigative news reporting related to the
criminal activities subject to grand jury investigation, and who
refused to even appear before the grand jury for
questioning.
156
Stone argued that the facts of his case required the State to
make a three-part showing - "relevancy, essentiality, and that
it has exhausted non-media sources for obtaining the informa-
tion" - before it could require him to surrender the tape.'57
Stone admitted that Branzburg did not require such a showing,
but he noted that many courts had required it and asserted that
152. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 29.
153. Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 20-21.
154. Infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text.
155. Branzburg is analyzed supra notes 6-73 and accompanying text.
156. Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 10-11; see also Nightline, supra note 128, at 2, 6
(remarks of Bradley Stone): "What I have is totally unrelated to any murder. I did
that interview six weeks before Trooper Hutchins was killed.... If I had the informa-
tion that a crime had been committed, I'd have to look at the case differently." But
see supra text accompanying note 152.
157. Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 14.
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it was "consistent with Branzburg and its progeny. ' 158 Citing
Cuthbertson,159 a criminal case in which the Third Circuit rec-
ognized a qualified reporter's privilege,16 ° Stone stated that the
Michigan courts and the federal district court
failed to balance the equities involved in these cases and to con-
sider the fact that often times the interests weighing in favor of
compelled disclosure during a criminal trial, such as the de-
fendant's right to confront witnesses and right to a fair trial,
are stronger than those involved in the grand jury setting.161
Stone then argued that Judge Giovan had- neither applied the
three-part test nor made sufficient factual findings to do so;
therefore, the contempt order violated the first amendment
and had to be vacated. 62
The prosecutor answered that the "sole support" for requir-
ing such a showing came from Justice Stewart's dissent in
Branzburg163 and that the Stewart position was rejected by
both the Court and Justice Powell. 64 The prosecutor conceded
that a three-part showing had been required in some cases, but
he implied that these all were civil cases'65 and that, in any
event, such cases "misinterpreted the true import of
Branzburg. "166 Moreover, stated the prosecutor, even if the
State were required to make such a showing, it had done so in
this case.' 67
Stone certainly was correct in saying that many courts had
required a three-part showing before disclosure of journalists'
confidential sources could be compelled. 6  As was discussed
above, however, this requirement generally has not been im-
posed in grand jury cases. 169 Nor was the prosecutor the first
person to express the opinion that cases recognizing a constitu-
158. Id.
159. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1126 (1981).
160. Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 15-16; see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying
text.
161. Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 17. For a related argument, see infra notes 197-
203 and accompanying text.
162. Stone-CA6, supra note 131, at 24.
163. The Stewart opinion is summarized supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
164. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 14.
165. The prosecutor did not cite Cuthbertson or attempt to distinguish it.
166. Prosecutor-CA6, supra note 125, at 19-20.
167. Id. at 22-29.
168. Supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
169. Supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
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tional reporter's privilege had misconstrued Branzburg. 170
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the prosecutor on both of his
major points: (1) that the State was not required to make a
three-part showing and (2) that, if the State were required to
meet a three-part test, it had done so. On the first point, the
court stated that the qualified privilege claimed by Stone was
the same one rejected in Branzburg.171 The court did not ad-
dress Stone's arguments about factual differences between his
case and the Branzburg cases.1 7 2 Noting that Cuthbertson and
several other cases had recognized a qualified privilege for pro-
tection of news sources, the Sixth Circuit declined "to join
some other circuit courts... [which have] adopted the qualified
privilege balancing process urged by the three Branzburg dis-
senters [ L73 and rejected by the majority.' 74 The court stated
that those other circuits had relied, at least in part, on Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg. 17' The Sixth Circuit
agreed with the prosecutor that such reliance was misplaced:
"Justice Powell's concurring opinion is entirely consistent with
the majority opinion, and neither limits or expands upon its
holding[;] ... instead, it responds to what Justice Powell per-
ceived as an unwarranted characterization of that holding by
Justice Stewart.' '1 76
The court added that "even if we were convinced of the exist-
ence of the qualified testimonial privilege claimed by Stone, his
claim of privilege would fail under the facts of this case. "177
The State, said the court, had shown that Stone had informa-
tion "clearly relevant to a specific violation of criminal law,' 178
that the information was not available elsewhere, and that the
State had a "compelling and overriding interest" in obtaining
the information - namely, effective law enforcement. 79
The Sixth Circuit did not hold that journalists are never enti-
170. See supra notes 4, 8, 57 & 75 and accompanying text.
171. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovan), 810
F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987).
172. Supra text accompanying note 156.
173. The court did not mention Justice Douglas's separate dissent in Branzburg.
174. 810 F.2d at 584 & n.6.
175. Id. at 585. The Powell opinion is summarized supra notes 46-53 and accompa-
nying text.
176. 810 F.2d at 585. For a different view of the Powell opinion, see supra notes 54-
56 and accompanying text.
177. 810 F.2d at 586.
178. Stone denied the relevancy. See supra note 156 (quoted remarks of Stone).
179. 810 F.2d at 586.
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tled to withhold information from a grand jury. The court in-
stead interpreted Branzburg as calling for a balancing process:
[C]ourts should, as did the Michigan state courts, follow the
admonition of the majority in Branzburg to make certain that
the proper balance is struck between freedom of the press and
the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony, by de-
termining whether the reporter is being harrassed in order to
disrupt his relationship with confidential news sources,
whether the grand jury's investigation is being conducted in
good faith, whether the information sought bears more than a
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investiga-
tion, and whether a legitimate law enforcement need will be
served by forced disclosure of the confidential source
relationship.180
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the way the Michigan trial court
"struck the balance:" in favor of disclosure of Stone's confiden-
tial information.'
The Sixth Circuit's decision did not send Stone back to jail.
By the time the opinion was issued - February 6, 1987 - the
grand jury term had expired, and Stone was no longer in con-
tempt.182 Police had made arrests in the state trooper's murder,
and Stone's attorneys thought it unlikely that the prosecutor
would again try to force Stone to surrender the videotape.'
Stone did not seek a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court.8
Iv
What Sort of Reporter's Privilege Should Exist?
The foregoing demonstrates that there is much disagreement
among jurists, commentators, prosecutors, journalists and
others as to what sort of protection the Constitution gives jour-
nalists who are trying to protect their sources in grand jury in-
quiries and other contexts. This part of the note examines the
philosophical, as opposed to legal, question whether or not any
protection should be afforded to journalists' confidential
sources.
At common law, there was no special privilege for report-
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Telephone interview with Zan M. Nicolli, attorney for Bradley M. Stone and
Storer Communications, Inc. (Apr. 10, 1987).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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ers.8 5 Courts refused to allow journalists to withhold confiden-
tial information from grand juries.18 6  Wigmore's famous
treatise on evidence cites a centuries-old "fundamental maxim
that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke)
has a right to every man's evidence." '87
There are strong societal arguments for departing from the
common-law rule:
It is indisputably in the general public's interest that report-
ers not be seen as agents or arms of the government or the
police. You may not always recognize it, but if you lived some-
where where that was not the case, you would quickly under-
stand why an independent press is a good thing. It is also
indisputable that often key sources will pass on information to
a reporter only on the condition of anonymity.'88
If reporters are sometimes required to disclose confidential
information, no potential informant can be sure that his iden-
tity or off-the-record communication will not later be revealed
through compelled testimony of the journalist."8 9 The reporter
who considers publishing controversial material must be aware
that such publication might lead to issuance of a subpoena
which, in turn, could require him to either violate a confidence
or be punished for contempt. 9 ' "Thus, we cannot escape the
conclusion that when neither the reporter nor his source can
rely on the shield of confidentiality against unrestrained use of
the grand jury's subpoena power, valuable information will not
be published and the public dialogue will inevitably be
impoverished."191
There are, however, other interests to be protected. The
Branzburg majority purported to reject "the theory that it is
better to write about crime than to do something about it."' 92
The chairman of the Michigan Senate Judiciary Committee,
Alan Cropsey, appeared on an ABC News Nightline telecast
185. Williams v. American Broadcasting Cos., 96 F.R.D. 658, 663 (W.D. Ark. 1983):
"It is now universally conceded that there was no journalist's privilege at common
law."
186. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972).
187. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). "This testimonial
duty to attend and disclose all that is needed for the ascertainment of truth applies to
every form and material of evidence whatever." Id. § 2193 (emphasis in original).
188. Nightline, supra note 128, at 1 (remarks of Ted Koppel, anchor).
189. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 731 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 731-32.
191. Id. at 736.
192. Id. at 692 (opinion of the Court).
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with Bradley Stone and one of Stone's attorneys the night of
Stone's release from jail. Cropsey explained what he feels is at
stake in the matter of shield laws:
Well, I think the question becomes .... should we allow spe-
cial privileges to members of the press and the broadcast media
that most other people in society do not have, and we must
balance that against the right of society to be secure in their
[sic] homes when a criminal act is committed. If you know
about that criminal act, and you are questioned about it, and
you are given a-subpoena to come in and testify on it, you must
do so. Now, are we going to give a shield law to the broadcast
people to say that, no, they do not have the obligation that
other people have. 9 '
Massachusetts Senate President William M. Bulger opposes
reporter's privilege in civil as well as criminal cases and, far
from recognizing any need for protection of journalists, main-
tains that society needs protection from the media:
The use of a reporter's privilege iri a way that frees a felon
from justice is antisocial. Its use to prevent the doing of equity
in a civil suit strikes at the very fabric of a peaceful society.
But its use in a defamation proceeding is most vicious of all....
There are newspapers, radio talk shows, and individual re-
porters and columnists that have a vested interest in defama-
tion. That is their stock in trade. They maintain their
audiences by shocking them with scandalous statements about
people in public life. Arm these wretches with a testimonial
privilege, and every reputation will be for sale for whatever it
will bring in readers, listeners, or coin. .... (1941
... The inequity, the hypocrisy, the injury to the public, and
the dangers created for our democracy by the pernicious doc-
trine of the shield law must be made clear to the American
people who can deal with any threat when fully aware of it.
But that is disturbingly difficult to do when the means of com-
munication are controlled by those seeking the privilege.
... The media are not watchmen on our ramparts, they are
193. Nightline, supra note 128, at 5 (remarks of Sen. Alan Cropsey).
194. Bulger's implication is that shield laws protect journalists from libel actions.
Experience shows that this is not necessarily true. A libel defendant's refusal to
name his source has been held to support an inference that no source exists. "This is
tantamount to saying the story was fabricated; the defendant will surely lose the
case." D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 327. See also Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcast-
ing & Cable Inc., 780 F.2d 340, 343, 352 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J., concurring)
(although Pennsylvania shield law chokes off sources from which public official libel
plaintiff might prove malice, it does not make victory impossible and does not violate
plaintiff's due process rights), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2927 (1986).
1988]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
huge corporations seeking profits. The media are not bound to
serve the public, because the public has nowhere else to turn in
a nation of one-newspaper cities. 195
Bulger notes that privileges are recognized to allow people to
have confidential relationships with doctors, lawyers and cler-
gymen, but he sees three important differences between those
privileges and a reporter's privilege: (1) doctors, lawyers and
clergymen are professionals bound by ethics codes, violations of
which could cost them the right to practice, but no comparable
discipline governs journalists' conduct; (2) the other privileges
are for the benefit of the patient, client or penitent, and can be
waived only by him, but a reporter's privilege can be waived by
the journalist without regard to the source's wishes; (3) the doc-
tor, lawyer or clergyman can get no personal advantage from
the privilege, but "a blackmailing journalist, a professional de-
famer, a liar who manufactures fraudulent 'news' stories, all
these can use such power for their personal gain and enrich-
ment. Unfortunately, such persons exist. They are not typical
of their calling, but they are not rarities, either."'96
No doubt most journalists would take offense at Bulger's re-
marks and would question the accuracy of some of his state-
ments. Bulger's article, however, serves to demonstrate that
even outside the context of grand jury investigations, there are
people strongly opposed to any special privilege to protect jour-
nalists' confidential sources.
While Bulger argues for uniform rejection of reporter's privi-
lege, another commentator argues for uniform recognition,
even in grand jury cases. 97 Douglas H. Frazer, author of a stu-
dent comment in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminol-
ogy, asserts that it is "at best anomalous, at worst
constitutionally inconsistent" for courts to recognize a qualified
privilege when disclosure is sought by a criminal defendant' 98
- who, after all, has a constitutional right to compel testi-
mony 99 - but not when disclosure is sought by a grand jury,
which has no such constitutional right.200 "If courts recognize
and weigh a qualified first amendment privilege when a com-
195. Bulger, supra note 4, at 535-36.
196. Id. at 535.
197. Comment, supra note 8.
198. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
199. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ... 
200. Comment, supra note 8, at 425.
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peting constitutional interest is at stake, a fortiori courts
should recognize and weigh the privilege when no competing
constitutional interest exists. '20 1
A "competing constitutional interest" does exist in federal
grand jury cases: the fifth amendment's guarantee of no prose-
cution for an "infamous" crime without a grand jury indict-
ment.20 2 A journalist conveivably could have confidential
information which would exculpate someone and cause a grand
jury not to indict him. In such a case, allowing the journalist to
withhold the information could cause the indictment of a de-
monstrably innocent person. Nevertheless, Frazer's argument
is interesting and, as he points out, it may be especially compel-
ling with regard to state grand jury proceedings, which are not
mandated by the United States Constitution.0 3
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has not limited or overruled its holdings
in Branzburg v. Hayes. It therefore can be said with confidence
that the first amendment does not give journalists a right to
refuse to appear before grand juries. Nor does it give them a
right to refuse to testify about criminal activity they have wit-
nessed.2 4 Beyond those statements, little can be said with cer-
tainty about first amendment protection for journalists'
confidential sources - except, of course, in the Sixth Circuit,
where the decision in Bradley Stone's case gives journalists lit-
tle hope for such protection. It appears, however, that most
courts give some protection, especially when disclosure is
sought by a civil litigant whose adversary is not the journalist.
When courts give protection, it usually is in the form of a
qualified privilege. The party seeking disclosure must show
201. Id. at 426.
202. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger ......
203. Comment, supra note 8, at 441. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884),
the Supreme Court rejected a convicted murderer's argument that charging him by
information rather than by grand jury indictment was a violation of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.
204. See Miller v. Mecklenburg County, 602 F. Supp. 675, 679 (W.D.N.C. 1985):
Of course, the qualified privilege does not apply when the reporter is being
questioned about an incident to which he or she may be a witness like any
other member of the public. In such a case, there is no intrustion into news-
gathering or the special functions of the press.
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that the information is relevant, that there is a compelling need
for it, and that it cannot be obtained elsewhere. This essen-
tially is the standard advocated by Justice Stewart, dissenting
in Branzburg, for grand jury cases. It seldom is applied to such
cases, because the Branzburg majority rejected such
application.
The Stewart test was not applied in the grand jury subpoena
case of Bradley Stone. He went to jail for one day, because he
refused to give up a videotape segment which might have re-
vealed the identities of confidential sources. Police suspected
that some of those sources might have murdered a state
trooper. Does the true public interest lie with Stone's position
or with the prosecutor's?
The concerns of journalists and others about negative effects
of compelled disclosure upon the media's ability to do their
work are not frivolous.2"5 Neither are concerns about effective
law enforcement and the unbridled pursuit of justice. How-
ever, an analysis such as Senator Bulger's - portraying jour-
nalists as arrogant, corrupt, and even dangerous, and belittling
their ethical standards - is not helpful. Any examination of
the important questions at hand must assume that all parties
are sincerely doing their best to make "the system" work
properly.
The importance of protecting journalists' confidential
sources is not in any way diminished by the nature of the party
seeking disclosure, be it a civil litigant, a criminal defendant, a
prosecutor, or a grand jury. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
require at least some showing of relevancy, need, and lack of
alternative sources in every case before disclosure may be
compelled.
The test should not be so applied as to place an unreasonable
burden on the party seeking disclosure. For example, a prose-
205. Contra Bulger, supra note 4, at 534:
There has never been any showing of probative evidence to prove that our
legal processes stifle or complicate, or even slow in any way, the free flow of
information in a nation drenched with veritable tidal waves of news "re-
ports," and "commentaries," "analyses," and "interpretations." None of the
thousands and thousands of media outlets-newspapers, magazines, televi-
sion and radio stations, book publishers and many others-has come forward
with proof of a problem. Predictably, none will, since through most of our
existence as a nation we needed no testimonial privilege to have the freest
and most aggressive press in the world. The privilege is sought to meet a
nonexistent problem.
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cutor trying to subpoena a videotape may not know its precise
contents and thus may be able to show only strong potential
relevancy. In such a case, if the prosecutor also shows necessity
and the unavailability of the information from other sources,
the subpoena should not be quashed.
In the Bradley Stone case, if Stone was correct in saying that
the judge who held him in contempt never entered into a bal-
ancing process, the prosecutor should at least have been re-
quired to make a Stewart-type showing before Stone could be
punished for refusing to surrender the tape. Of course, the
Sixth Circuit stated its opinion that the State could have satis-
fied such a test. But the court's bottom line - that the three-
part test is never constitutionally required - may have serious
consequences for the future. Catching and prosecuting
criminals certainly is important, but so is maintaining the abil-
ity of journalists to communicate with confidential sources and
bring viewers, listeners and readers important stories which
otherwise would go unreported.
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